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1. From economics to psychology
The utility concept is a key concept in economics. It is well-known that modern
economics is a discipline with numerous sub…elds, but nearly all relevant prob-
lems have to do with people and people’s choice behavior. Individuals have limited
resources and opportunities and therefore must choose between alternatives, for
example, 1;2;3;::;i;... An e¢cient way to describe the choice problem is to at-
tach a utility value to these alternatives, for example, U1;U2;U3;::;Ui; .. and to
postulate that an individual chooses the alternative which has the highest utility
value for him. For example, if there is a choice set {1;2;3;::;i,..}, then the choice
behavior is described mathematically bymax
i=1;2;3;::Ui
The implication of this description is that we could predict the individual’s
choice behavior by knowing his utility values U1, U2, U3;:: In empirical reality it
is the other way around. We do not know the values of U, but we may observe
the choice process. If an individual consistently chooses alternative 1, economists
generally infer that U1 is larger than U2, U3;:: If we then remove alternative 1
from the choice set and 2 is chosen consistenty we know that U1>U2 and that
U2 is larger than other U values. In this way, it is possible to …nd the preference
ordering of the alternatives and also to establish inequality relations between the
U values. However, we are unable to say whether U2 is a little smaller than U1 or
if U2 is much smaller than U1. In short, by observing choices we get an ordinal
utility ordering.
The choice model may be extended in two ways. First, we can consider a
set of alternatives that is in…nite. Alternatives can be described by a continuous
variable x or by more than one variable, for example, (x1;x2;::;xn) = x. Then
the utility values are denoted by the ordinal utility function U(x): Secondly, we
may assume that each decision maker z has his own utility ordering. In that case,
the ordinal utility function reads U(x;z) where z may incorporate individually
varying parameters such as age, gender, income, social class, etc. We notice
that this ordinal function is of the decision-utility type in the terminology of
Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin (1997). It is needed to make decisions and is
empirically established by observations of choice decisions1.
The traditional example of choice behavior in economics is the purchasing
behavior of consumers. The model starts from a utility function
U(x;z)
where x stands for quantities of commodities purchased and z for character-
istics describing the individual’s circumstances (e.g. age, gender). The consumer
is faced by prices p1, .., pn for goods x1 to xn. If he has income y, his choice set
is described by:
p1x1 + :: + pnxn ￿ y
1Decision utility in the sense of Kahneman et al. may be ordinal or cardinal.
2Any commodity bundle (x1;x2;::;xn) violating the constraint is too expensive
for him. The behavioral model explains behavior by assuming that individuals
maximize U(.;z) with respect to the feasible commodity bundle x subject to the
freedom given by the choice set.
Edgeworth (1881) called U(.) the utility function; Pareto (1904) called it the
ophelimity function. Edgeworth more or less implicitly assumed that U could be
measured in a direct way. Samuelson (1945) therefore stated that ”Edgeworth
considered utility to be as real as his morning jam.” Edgeworth interpreted U
as experienced utility, that is, a cardinal measure of the joy which the individual
derives from the commodity bundle. Pareto became aware of the fact that it
could be di¢cult to establish the individual’s utility function over goods. For
the description of the consumer choice process, an experienced utility function
appeared to be unnecessary. Actually, it is a choice between alternatives which
may be described by an ordinal utility function as described above. If U(.) is an
ordinal utility function, any other utility function which assigns the same ordering
of utility to the alternatives is also a utility function describing that same choice
process. For example, if U1 > U2 > U3 > 0 describes the choice process between
alternatives 1,2,3 then ~ U1 =
p
U1 > ~ U2 =
p
U2 > ~ U3 =
p
U3 will describe the
same process. Hence there is a whole equivalence class of ordinal utility functions
describing the same preference structure.
It is an error to assume that Pareto denied the existence of meaningful cardinal
utility measurement or the possibility of measuring it, but he pointed to the fact
that utility in the cardinal sense could not be measured by observing consumer
behavior, and moreover that it was unnecessary to do so for consumer studies.
Robbins (1932), who had a tremendous in‡uence on economics, was the …rst
to proclaim that utility was immeasurable and that it was more or less a scienti…c
folly to endeavor to measure it. At the very least, it should be left to psychologists.
Other economists such as Pigou (1948), and the Nobel laureates Tinbergen
(1991) and Frisch (1932) were certainly of a di¤erent opinion.
However, the ordinal line has been continued by Arrow (1951) and Debreu
(1959) who were able to include decisions over time and/or under uncertainty in
this ordinal framework. They assume a preference ranking described by a utility
function on the dated commodity space. Behavior is subject to a budget constraint
where the consumption of goods and the prices of those goods are di¤erentiated
according to the date of consumption.
Similarly, they incorporate uncertainty by distinguishing states of nature s
varying over S and commodities available only if s prevails. Commodities are
3then available contingent on the status of nature, which is a priori not known
to an individual. It can be shown that the model describes consumer choice be-
havior, but it is also clear that this model leads to a decision problem with an
unworkable number of dimensions. Its realism as a positive behavioral model is
not signi…cant and it has never been used according to our knowledge in empirical
work, except in very simpli…ed versions.
In practice, economists are frequently confronted by problems where more is
needed than the ordinal concept (see also Ng (1997)).
We think of decisions under uncertainty, the basis of insurance theory, invest-
ment and saving behavior. Decisions which have to do with di¤erent time periods
such as saving and investment decisions need more than the ordinal concept. The





psUs where Ut stands for instantaneous period utilities and wt
time-discounting weights, and where Us stands for state-contingent utility and
ps for the (real or perceived) chance that state s occurs. Evidently, time-state
mixtures and continuous generalizations are easy to think of.
There are two points of interest in these objective functions. The basic in-
gredient is a utility function U which is no longer ordinal. We cannot change
the individual form at will according to a monotonous transformation. More
speci…cally, maximizing
P
twt'(Ut) will yield an optimum which varies with '(:);
except if ' is a positive linear transformation (i.e., '(:) = ®U + ¯ with ® > 0).
The utility concept in these kinds of problems is what economists call a cardinal
utility function. It is a much smaller class which only allows for positive linear
transformations.
Most mainstream economists have a very uneasy feeling about cardinal utility
functions. This uneasiness seems to be based on the Anglo-American dogmatism
against cardinality instilled by Robbins. However, most actual studies conducted
by economists start with very general ”ordinal formulations”, but after a while
they present a structural speci…cation which in nine times out of ten turns out
to be of the cardinal type (see also Van Praag (1968)). These cardinal utility
functions are still of the ”decision-utility” type. They are instrumental to the
description of decision processes.
There is a second class of problems for which economists need cardinal utility
functions: normative problems. The …rst example of such problems arises if we try
to look for optimal (re)distributions. Notably in income taxation, a progressive
tax schedule (richer individuals pay relatively more tax than poorer individuals)
4is advocated so that that the rich man su¤ers as much as the poor man. Such
comparisons are impossible without a cardinal and interpersonally comparable
utility function. Obviously, these utility functions are of the experienced utility
type.
A second example is provided by equity measures: the concepts of a just
income distribution and poverty and the evaluation of income inequality. It is
evident that nearly all of these measures are based on a cardinal concept of ex-
perienced income utility, though this is rarely mentioned explicitly (c.f. Atkinson
(1970)).
A third …eld where interpersonally comparable and cardinal utility is needed
concerns all types of cost-bene…t analyses, where speci…c measures such as build-
ing a bridge, deregulation of markets, speci…c health insurance programs, noise
pollution by an airport, etc., have to be evaluated. In these cases, some citizens
will pro…t and others will lose. Those bene…ts and costs may be partially trans-
lated in monetary amounts, but money means di¤erent things for di¤erent people.
For example, when a policy means a loss of $100 to a poor man and a gain of
$10,000 to a rich man, it is not at all evident that the policy should be realized.
The only way to make a decision is to create a balance in terms of comparable
utility gains and losses.
The situation in economics is succinctly and wittily summarised by Wansbeek
and Kapteyn.
”Utility seems to be to economists what the Lord is to theologians.
Economists talk about utility all the time, but do not seem to have
hope of ever observing it this side of heaven. In micro-economic theory,
almost every model is built on utility functions of some kind. In empir-
ical work little attempt is made to measure this all-pervasive concept.
The concept is considered to be so esoteric as to defy direct measure-
ment by mortals. Still, in a di¤erent role, viz., of non-economists, the
same mortals are the sole possessors of utility functions and can do
incredible things with it.” (Kyklos, 36, pp. 249-269, 1983).
By detaching economics from the psychology of ”feelings”, economists have
found it di¢cult to have anything relevant to say on a whole range of issues. In
the second part of this paper, we will review an attempt made by economists to
measure utility functions using the evaluations given by individuals themselves.
Before we do so however, we will …rst discuss the approaches taken in general
to utility functions in the economic literature. We will divide the approaches
5that have been taken concerning the problem of utility functions in …ve distinct
approaches.
2. General approaches to cardinal utility taken by economists
The …rst approach to cardinal utility, which is by far the most popular in the
economic profession, is not to measure utility at all, but to simply assume a
functional form of the utility function for the theoretical or empirical problem at
hand. We will ignore this approach in the remainder of this chapter.
Economists who use the second approach, of which perhaps the best-known
are Christensen et al. (1985) and Jorgenson and Slesnick (1984), have taken an
axiomatic approach to utility functions. They specify the conditions they believe
a utility function should satisfy and then derive (a shape of) the utility function
which …ts these requirements.2 They then infer the level of utility that individ-
uals enjoy from their observed behavior, which they then use to make normative
statements. As utility levels are not directly measured in this approach, but es-
sentially assumed, this approach is not elaborated here. Moreover, if this method
has validity, it yields a cardinal decision utility.
Economists who take the third approach use subjective and objective indica-
tors of the work and living conditions of individuals to de…ne a measure of utility.
This large group is subdivided into three groups: one group is concerned with
poor individuals, another with the quality of life of nations, another with the
quality of life of individuals.
The empirical literature on poverty centers around the material resources avail-
able to individuals (Townsend (1979, 1993), Sen (1987), Ravallion (1994)). The
standard approach is to de…ne households to be poor if their household income
falls below a certain cut-o¤ point. This cut-o¤ point can be de…ned in several
ways. For instance, in the ”basic needs” approach, the cut-o¤ point is calculated
from the expenditures needed to buy a basket of commodities that the researcher
considers vital for individuals. In the relative needs approach, the cut-o¤ point is
de…ned to be a certain percentage of the average or median income in a country.
It is clear that neither approach, which together form the bulk of the poverty
literature, actually measures utility functions, but that they are based on the as-
sumption that the utility of individuals whose income is below the cut-o¤ point
2See also Van Praag (1968) for an attempt to …nd a functional form of the utility function
with the use of axioms and secondary assumptions.
6is in some sense ”low”. See Callan and Nolan (1991) and Frijters and Van Praag
(1996) for a more detailed review of the normative issues involved in poverty mea-
surement.
Other literature examines the ”quality of life” of nations. In this litera-
ture (Kurian (1984), Nussbaum and Sen (1992), Sen (1987), Maasoumi (1989)),
economists attempt to rank countries with respect to the quality of life.3 The
quality of life is usually de…ned as a weighted average of speci…c country statis-
tics. The statistics used include, for instance, the literacy level of the entire
population, the literacy level of women, infant mortality rates, income levels per
head, life expectancies of men and women, indicators of political stability, en-
ergy consumption per capita, average household size, the number of persons per
physician, levels of civil liberties, etc. It is clear that these variables may be very
important for the utility levels of individuals and nations, however the utility lev-
els themselves are not measured by these variables. An obvious problem is then
how one should weigh these statistics: does the quality of life increase more when
the female literacy level increases by 1% or when the civil liberty index improves
by 1%? It will be clear that if one does not want to use the evaluations of indi-
viduals themselves as a weighting method, the opinions of the researcher become
the deciding criterium. The problem of how to weigh these di¤erent variables into
a composite quality of life index is, not surprisingly, the main source of disputes
in this literature. For an empirical analysis of some of the weighting methods
employed, see Hirschberg et al. (1991).
Some of the works of Clark and Oswald (e.g. Clark and Oswald (1994)) also
belong to the third category. In their 1994 paper, Clark and Oswald de…ne ”un-
happiness” by aggregating the answers to the following 12 questions:
1. Been able to concentrate on whatever you are doing?
2. Lost much sleep over worry?
3. Felt that you are playing a useful part in things?
4. Felt capable of making decisions about things?
5. Felt constantly under strain?
6. Felt you couldn’t overcome your di¢culties?
7. Been able to enjoy your normal day-to-day activities?
3The ”quality of life” concept is very broad and interpreted by some to mean the same thing
as happiness (e.g. Veenhoven (1996)), or average satisfaction (e.g. Dow and Juster (1985)). We
discuss here the interpretation we believe most economists in this …eld use.
78. Been able to face your problems?
9. Been feeling unhappy and depressed?
10. Been losing con…dence in yourself?
11. Been thinking of yourself as a worthless person?
12. Been feeling reasonably happy, all things considered?
The variable ”unhappiness” ranges from 0 to 12, whereby 12 denotes the max-
imum level of unhappiness and 0 a complete lack of unhappiness. Although some
of these questions could arguably be seen as a measure of utility, such as questions
9 and 12, the simple aggregate of all 12 questions cannot be seen as a direct mea-
surement of utility: utility is an evaluation of an individual of his circumstances.
Although ”losing a lot of sleep” or ”being under strain” may a¤ect utility or may
be a¤ected by utility, they do not directly measure a utility level for they are not
an evaluation of ”losing sleep” or ”being under strain”. This measure of happi-
ness may correlate perfectly with the experienced utility of individuals and may
hence be as useful as any other measure of experienced utility. Nevertheless, it
remains an indirect measure of experienced utility which is useful only if ”losing
sleep” and ”being under strain” correlate with experienced utility (which seems
very likely). Hence, it is a measure of the quality of life entirely on its own. Clark
and Oswald seem to acknowledge this by arguing that the individual scores are
”more accurately” described as ”mental stress” scores. Other individual measures
of the quality of life of an individual which are based on aggregations of individual
circumstances also fall into this category.
A fourth approach was to estimate decision utility functions by performing
probability-choice experiments on individuals. When individuals must choose be-
tween either a certain outcome Y or a lottery in which fate decides whether they
will receive an outcome less than Y or an outcome greater than Y, individuals
will reveal the relative attractiveness of the sure Y versus the proposed lottery.
The main problem in this line of research has been that individuals are not good
at using probabilities: they overestimate small probabilities and underestimate
large probabilities, as was …rst demonstrated by the Allais paradox (see Allais
and Hagen (1979)). This means that the choice of an individual for a lottery
is the result of a combination of the individual’s valuation of the outcomes and
of the individual’s perception of the probability of the outcomes. Following the
theoretical advances by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Wakker and Tversky
(1993), Kahneman et al. (1991) have managed to isolate the e¤ect of gains and
8Figure 2.1:
losses on individual’s evaluation of outcomes. We will ignore the results on proba-
bilities and focus on the value function they …nd. The shape of the value function
suggested by the choice experiments of Kahneman et al. (1991) is sketched in
…gure 1.
The main feature of this function is that losses are found to have a greater im-
pact than gains. A second characteristic of this value function is that it levels o¤
at either end of the loss or gain scale, which implies decreasing marginal value of
losses and gains. It implies a convex-concave shape, also suggested by Markowitz
(1952) and Van Praag (1968).
Finally, the …fth approach taken is to assume that individuals are able to de-
scribe their utility level by means of verbal quali…cations. The rest of this chapter
will be devoted to the attempts of economists who belong to the Leyden group
where this approach was initiated. There are of course also other economists who
use verbal quali…ers as measures of experienced utility (e.g. Clark (1996), Clark
and Oswald (1996), Heywood et al. (1997), Levy-Garboua and Montmarquette
(1997), Easterlin (1974, 1995), Dow and Juster (1985), and Gershuny and Halpin
(1995)).
93. Utility measurement based on verbal quali…ers
3.1. The Leyden approach
In this section we will discuss an economic line of research which tries to opera-
tionalize the concept of experienced utility. It originated at Leyden University in
the Netherlands in the early 1970s. Its main contributors are Van Praag, Kapteyn,
Wansbeek, Hagenaars, Van der Sar, Plug, and Frijters. It is known in the liter-
ature as the Leyden approach (or school). For psychologists, the ideas in this
approach may not appear alien, but for most economists they were and still are.
Most economists still believe that cardinal experienced utility is unmeasurable
and that any measurement should be based on observed decision behavior. This
meant that the Leyden approach met with sti¤ opposition, disbelief and outright
hostility. The most outspoken example of this attitude is found in an article by
Seidl (1994) in the European Economic Review where he criticises Van Praag
(1968)4.
Although Van Praag (1968) served as a theoretical basis, the ensuing literature
on the Leyden approach started with Van Praag (1971) and is mainly empirical
and data-oriented. The Leyden approach focuses primarily on the evaluation of
income, although in later work the focus was extended. We also speak of utility
of income, income satisfaction, or, in other words, economic welfare. We drop
the adjective economic from now on, but when we use the term welfare, we have
welfare derived from income in mind. This concept is narrower than the concept of
well-being which includes feelings associated with factors unconnected to income
or purchasing power. In Section 7 we shall consider well-being and its relationship
with welfare in greater detail.
The Leyden approach is based on two assumptions. The …rst is that individuals
are able to evaluate income levels in general and their own income in particular
in terms of ”good”, ”bad”, ”su¢cient”, etc. We call these terms verbal quali…ers.
The second assumption is that verbal labels can be translated in a meaningful
way into a numerical evaluation on a bounded scale, for example [0,1]. We shall
consider both steps of the measurement procedure in detail.
If we are interested in how a speci…c income level is evaluated, there are two
ways to gather information. The …rst and most natural way is to propose a
sequence of income levels and to ask for their verbal quali…cations. An example
of this type of question follows:
4A reply was given by Van Praag and Kapteyn (1995).
10”Here is a list of income levels per month, after tax: please evaluate
these amounts using verbal quali…cations, such as ”very bad”, ”bad”,






It is obvious that someone who earns $20,000 a month would be unable to
make a distinction between most of these levels. All the incomes are insu¢cient
or worse for him. Therefore, instead of starting with income levels, we can also
supply the verbal quali…cations as stimuli and ask the individual respondent which
income level corresponds with the verbal label. This leads to the so-called Income
Evaluation Question:
”while keeping prices constant, what after-tax total monthly income






very good, ............................................ $..........
This questionappears to have been succesful in anonymous mail-questionnaires,
although it has also been posed orally with success. Theoretically, …nding a con-
tinuous relationship between income and utility would require an in…nite number
of levels, but, in practice, between four to nine levels have been and can be used.
We will discuss here the format used most often, the six-level format.
The question is now how we derive a welfare function from the answers to
this question. Or more precisely, how we translate the verbal labels into numbers
11on a [0,1] scale. Following Van Praag (1971), we make an assumption about the
way individuals …ll out the question. We assume that respondents try to provide
information to the interviewer about the shape of their welfare function. The most
accurate way for individuals to provide information then depends on the accuracy
criterion. Van Praag (1971) and Kapteyn (1977) show that, for a broad class of
intuitively plausible criterion functions, the best way for a respondent to provide
information is to choose the answers in such a way that each of the six levels
corresponds to a jump of 1/6. This is the so-called equal quantile assumption
(EQA). It implies that
U(very bad) = U(…rst interval) = 1=12
U(bad) = U(second interval) = 3=12
::
::
U(very good) = U(last interval) = 11=12
It may be surmised that, even if the verbal descriptions are somewhat vague,
the respondent will tend to interpret the question as if it were an equal partition.
Only if the verbal labels are ambiguous, practically equal or strongly suggest an
unequal partition, we should no longer expect this e¤ect.
If the number of verbal labels is k, the general formula for the welfare corre-
sponding to the ith verbal label is obviously 2i¡1
2k : This reasoning and the EQA
assumption are very similar to the thesis developed by Parducci (see e.g. Par-
ducci (1995)). It is obvious that this translation of verbal labels into numbers is
a linking pin in this measurement procedure. It has been subject to criticism by
some economists, while on the other hand experimental psychologists do not …nd
much to criticize: it is a type of Thurstonian measurement. If we do not accept
this or any translation into …gures, it is obvious that a meaningful analysis of the
response is severely hampered, although not impossible (see later).
In Van Praag (1991), an experiment is described in which …ve labels were
supplied and 364 respondents were asked to ”translate” these verbal labels onto a
[0,100]-scale. Similarly, the same labels had to be linked with line segments. Both
the numbers between [0,100] and the lengths of the line segments were re-scaled
onto a [0,1] mapping. We present the average results for 364 respondents in Table
1.
12Table 1: Translation into numbers and line segments
Numbers: Emprical mean St. dev. Theor. pred.
very bad ¹ v1 = 0:0892 0.0927 0.1
bad ¹ v2 = 0:2013 0.1234 0.3
not bad, not good ¹ v3 = 0:4719 0.1117 0.5
good ¹ v4 = 0:6682 0.1169 0.7
very good ¹ v5 = 0:8655 0.0941 0.9
Line segments
very bad ¹ w1 = 0:0734 0.0556 0.1
bad ¹ w2 = 0:1799 0.0934 0.3
not good, not bad ¹ w3 = 0:4008 0.1056 0.5
good ¹ w4 = 0:5980 0.1158 0.7
very good ¹ w5 = 0:8230 0.1195 0.9
Source: Van Praag (1991)
For the ”numbers” case, one can see that all averages fall within a one ¾¡interval
of their theoretical prediction. This also holds for all levels for the line segments,
except one. It is intriguing that the averages are all below their theoretical pre-
diction. Perhaps this is due to the order in which the verbal labels were supplied.
We think, but do not know, that the bias would have been the other way around if
the order in which the verbal labels were supplied was reversed. When we regress
the translation of the verbal labels into numbers by individual i, say vi;n, onto the
translation of the verbal label into a line-segment, say wi;n; we …nd




for 364*5 observations, where we did not account for the fact that the …ve
level disturbances per individual will be strongly correlated. The …t is however
remarkably good. From Table 1 and this regression, we can draw some tentative
conclusions:
1. A verbal label sequence seems to be understood in a similar way by di¤erent
respondents, irrespective of the context of the individual respondent.
2. A verbal label sequence may be translated on a numerical scale or on a line
scale: in both cases the translations are uniform over individuals.
133. Translations via various translation mechanisms (lines and …gures) are con-
sistent with each other. That is, we seem to be measuring the same thing,
irrespective of whether we use line segments or numbers.
4. The verbal labels are translated on a bounded scale roughly in accordance
with the Equal Quantile Assumption.
An interesting point is that these results were found in a context-free setting,
that is, the respondents did not know which concept they were evaluating.
A …nal point of critique is whether the verbal labels ”good”, ”bad”, etc., convey
the same feeling to every respondent. If not, we falsely assume that individuals
derive the same degree of joy from their income, when describing the same verbal
label. Actually, this is a question of psycho-linguistics. Generally, the basic
idea of language is that frequently used words will have the same meaning and
emotional connotation for the members of a language community. It is the main
tool of communication between people. Hence, we must assume that verbal labels
like ”good”, ”bad”, etc., mean approximately the same thing to all respondents
sharing the same language.
3.2. The shape of the welfare function
For each respondent we now have six income levels connected to six utility levels.
The shape of the function can be inferred from these six combinations. Many
functions can be …tted using these six points. In Van Praag (1968), it was argued
on theoretical reasons that it would be a lognormal distribution function. The
reason to use a distribution function is that we assume boundedness of the utility
function: there is a worst and a best position in terms of welfare (satisfaction).
It is also known that the Von Neumann-Morgenstern model requires a bounded
utility function (see Savage (1954)).
Van Herwaarden and Kapteyn (1981) showed that the points of the welfare
function, which were found empirically, best …tted a lognormal curve within the
class of distribution functions. The logarithmic function did slightly better, but
it is not bounded. Also, the logarithmic function is not borne out by the choice
experiments of Kahneman et al. (1991) and others: the marginal e¤ect of greater
losses is found to decrease, whereas the logarithmic function would imply that
they should increase.
The lognormal function is de…ned as
14Figure 3.1:




where N(.;0,1) stands for the standard lognormal distribution function. The log-
normal function is sketched in Figure 2. Notice the resemblance to the shape
suggested by the experiments of Kahneman et al. (1991): in both cases the func-
tion is S-shaped. Also, it is generally the case that losses to an individual have a
greater e¤ect than gains.5
The parameter ¹ is interpreted by realizing that ¤(e¹;¹;¾) = 0:5: Hence, the
income level e¹ is halfway between the worst and the best situation.
There are two interesting aspects about this function. First, the function is
not concave for all income levels, but convex for low incomes. This runs counter
to mainstream economic assumptions. In economics, it is conventional wisdom
that the utility function of income is always concave. This is known as the so-
called Law of Decreasing Marginal Utility, also known as Gossen’s …rst law. It
has always been based on introspection. Concavity implies that individuals are
risk-averse, but scienti…c experiments with insurance or gambling behavior show
5One particular feature of the value function found by Kahneman et al. (1991) cannot be
replicated: Kahneman et al. …nd a value function which changes direction abruptly at the
reference position. The number of levels used in our measure is simply too small to …nd such a
jump in direction.
15Figure 3.2:
that this is not always true; it therefore follows that a utility function may be
convex in certain regions.6
The second point of interest about the lognormal utlity function consists of
the two parameters ¹ and ¾ which may vary individually. Two functions with
di¤erent ¹ and equal ¾ are sketched in Figure 3a. In Figure 3b two functions are
sketched with di¤erent ¾ and equal ¹.
One can see that as ¹ increases, the individual needs more income to reach
the same welfare level. For instance, in order to reach the welfare level 0.5, the
person A with ¹A = ln(4000) needs $4000 per month, while B needs $6000 per
month to reach the same welfare level. If the welfare levels of individuals A and
B are to be equal for other welfare levels (if ¾ is equal for both persons), it should
hold that
lnyA ¡ ¹A = lnyB ¡ ¹B
Hence, for any welfare level, income levels are equivalent to A and B if
6A variable of much economic interest, Pratt’s (1964) measure of relative risk aversion (or
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Hence, a change in ¹ implies a proportional shift of the welfare function. One
of our main preocupations in the remaining section is to discover why individual’s
¹¡values di¤er.
The parameter ¾ de…nes the slope of the welfare function.
In Figure 3b, two functions are sketched with ¾A < ¾B: If ¾ = 0 we get the
limiting case where individuals are completely unsatis…ed with any income until
their income reaches e¹, and where they are completely satis…ed if income exceeds
e¹: It is the welfare function of a Hermit. The parameter ¾ is called the welfare
sensitivity of the individual.











where c1; .., c6 stand for the six income levels reported in the IEQ.
173.3. The de…nition of income
In the usual IEQ version, the income concept is after-tax monthly household
income. In some versions income per year has also been used and/or before tax
income (see Dubno¤ et al. (1981)). The choice of the de…nition should be adapted
to what is well-known to the individual. Hence, an entrepreneur who knows his
annual income better than his monthly income should be questioned in terms of
his annual income, while a civil servant who is paid monthly should be approached
in terms of his monthly income.
4. The explanation of the welfare function
In mainstream literature, it is always assumed that the utility function of income
is the same for all individuals. A major …nding of our empirical research, although
intuitively completely plausible, is that individual welfare functions di¤er between
individuals. When di¤erences are found, the imminent question is whether such
di¤erences are structural and can be correlated with observable variables. In our
case, this means that we try to ”explain” the variable ¹ by other factors, varying
per individual and/or environment. In the studies, it appeared that ¹ could be
explained to a large extent7. The parameter ¾ posed much more of a problem. We
shall therefore concentrate on the explanation of ¹ and assume that ¾ is constant.
We recall that ¹ determines the position of U(y). If ¹ increases, the individual
becomes less satis…ed with the same amount of income. In other words U(y;¹) is
decreasing in ¹: The …rst determinant that naturally comes to mind is the size
of the family to be supported from the income. Income needs are probably also
determined by the actual circumstances of the individual, for instance as re‡ected
by the individual’s current income yc: We therefore expect that needs will increase
with family size (denoted by fs) and with current income yc: Hence, fs and yc
are parameters in the individual welfare function. In Van Praag (1971) and Van
Praag and Kapteyn (1973), the following simple relation has been found
¹i = constant + ¯1lnfsi + ¯2lnyi;c (4.1)
In Van Praag and Kapteyn (1973), the following (approximate values) were
found ¯1 = 0:1 and ¯2 = 0:6; R2 = 0:6, where fsi denotes the number of individu-
als living in the household of respondent i, and yi;c denotes the current household
7An explanation does not necessarily mean a one-way causal relationship.
18income of i.
Since then, the IEQ has been posed in many countries, and similar results
have been found. We give an example drawn from a study on poverty by Van
Praag, Hagenaars and Van Weeren (1982), based on a 1979 EUROSTAT survey
of eight European countries. Moreover, we add values for Russia estimated by
Frijters and Van Praag (1996). In Table 2, we present the regression estimates for
the nine countries using the equation
¹i = ¯0 + ¯1lnfsi + ¯2lnyi;c + f(Xi) + ui
where X denotes a number of variables used in the regression which we do not
show (including age, education , employment levels and gender), and ui denotes
the normally distributed error term.
Table 2: Estimates of welfare parameters for 9 countries
Countries
¯1 ¯2 N R2
Belgium 0.097 0.433 1272 0.695
Denmark 0.075 0.631 1972 0.829
France 0.059 0.505 2052 0.676
W. Germany 0.112 0.583 1574 0.693
Great Br. 0.115 0.364 1183 0.575
Ireland 0.169 0.455 1733 0.636
Italy 0.156 0.381 1911 0.510
The Netherlands 0.100 0.537 1933 0.664
Russia 1995 0.250 0.501 1444 0.501
Source : Van Praag, Hagenaars and Van Weeren (1982)
All coe¢cients are highly signi…cant.
The variables vary over the nine countries but not dramatically. The value
of ¯1 of course depends on the national family allowance system. If the family
allowance is high and compensates for the additional child costs, we may expect a
¯1 of about zero. On the other hand, in poor countries with a less liberal system,
¯1 may be rather high. This is indeed what we observe: the highest coe¢cient of
¯1 is for Russia in 1995 where family allowances and child support are virtually
non existent.
It is not surprising that the satisfaction derived from a speci…c income level
depends on the size of the household. Somewhat more surprising, especially for
most economists, is that income satisfaction for any income level, not only for an
individual’s own current income, depends on an individual’s own current income.
19Figure 4.1:
It implies that two individual A and B with current incomes yA;c and yB;c will
evaluate any income di¤erently. More precisely, the following is usually true:
U(yB;fs;yB) 6= U(yB;fs;yA)
That is, B evaluates his own income di¤erently than A would evaluate the
income of B. It is obvious that this fact is very relevant for the evaluation of social
inequality, for the theory of a fair income distribution and for the evaluation of
social welfare. The outcomes of such normative evaluations depend on the income
norm of the evaluations. Actually, UA(y;fsA;yA;c) describes the norms of A with
respect to what equals a ”bad”,..,”good” income and all levels in between.
A person’s income may increase, for example from y(1)
c to y(2)
c . The evaluation
of this change will be evaluated di¤erently before the change and after the change,
or, as economists say, ex ante and ex post. The ex ante evaluation of future income
is UA(y(2)
c ;fs;y(1)
c ); while the ex post evaluation is UA(y(2)
c ;fs;y(2)
c ): We sketch the
di¤erence between the ex ante and ex post welfare function in …gure 4.
Due to the fact that ¹ increases with the income change, the welfare function
shifts to the right. The e¤ect of this is that the ex post evaluation of both y(1)
c
and y(2)
c falls compared to the corresponding ex ante evaluations. It can be seen,
and also shown, that the ex ante welfare gain is larger than the ex post gain. As a
consequence, the ex ante evaluation is exaggerated when reconsidered later on, or
20to put it di¤erently, the income increase will be a disappointment in retrospect.
The value of the coe¢cient ¯2 is crucial in this context. If ¯2 = 0; the curve will
not shift to the right and the whole income increase will be translated as a welfare
increase. In that case ex ante and ex post evaluations are equal.
On the other hand, if ¯2 = 1; perceived welfare will not increase at all. This
can be seen by examining
lnyc ¡ ¹ = lnyc ¡ ¯0 ¡ ¯1lnfs ¡ 1:00lnyc = ¡¯0 ¡ ¯1 lnfs
In this case, the subjective ex post welfare evaluation does not depend on
actual income. Evidently, this is a pathological case which has not been found in
reality. The anticipated welfare increase would end with a complete deception.
The phenomenon of a shifting welfare function arising from a partial adapta-
tion of income norms to changing current incomes, is what Brickman and Cam-
bell (1971) called the hedonic ”treadmill”. Van Praag (1971) introduced the term
”preference drift” for the same phenomenon.
If all individuals have their own norms with regard to income levels, which
depend on their own circumstances, the question is justi…ed whether it is possible
to construct social standards with respect to what is a ”good” income, a ”bad”
income, etc. This is possible in a certain sense. We de…ne a social standard for a
”good” income, say ˜ ygood; as that level of income which is evaluated to be ”good”
by an individual with that current income. If ”good” income corresponds with
a welfare value of 0.7 on a [0,1] scale, it implies that ˜ ygood is the solution to the
equation
U(~ ygood;fs; ~ ygood) = 0:7
Using lognormality and our estimate of ¹; it is possible to show that







Similarly, we can obtain a social standard income for each possible welfare
level, sketched in the next …gure.
We call the ensuing welfare function of the social standard income levels, which
is also lognormal, a social standard function. We know that someone with ˜ y¤
0:4 cur-
rent income will evaluate his own income by 0.4. This analysis is frequently used
to de…ne a subjective poverty line as ˜ y¤
0:4 for poverty and ˜ y¤
0:5 as near-poverty. No-
tice that this line varies as a function of family size. Hence, there is a two-person
21Figure 4.2:
household poverty line, a three-person poverty line, etc. The social standard func-
tion is an obvious tool for social policy and the evaluation of income redistribution
and tax policy.
From a social-psychological viewpoint, it is very interesting to compare the
welfare sensitivity of the individual welfare function ¾ with the corresponding
slope parameter of the social standard function ¾
1¡¯2: If 0<¯2 < 1; the latter
function is less steep than its individual counterpart. In other words, the larger
the preference drift ¯2; or in psychological terms, the stronger the working of the
hedonic treadmill, the ‡atter the social standard curve will be compared to the
individual welfare function.
Obviously, the di¤erence between the two functions explains why a person with
moderate income, for instance $40,000 a year, thinks that someone with $100,000
is rich while the rich person himself with $100,000 does not perceive himself to
be rich. In the same way, people with $20,000 do not feel as poor as the observer
earning $40,000 thinks they would.
The explanation of ¹ by individual variables and the stability of these expla-
nations over samples (see also Van Praag and Van der Sar (1988)) may be seen
as indirect evidence for the validity of the Welfare Function of Income. The mea-
sured concept may be explained to a certain extent by individual circumstances
in a plausible way. One of the more recent additions is a quadratic part in age.
22It is seen that …nancial needs are greatest at the age of about 40.
However, the explanation of ¹ may be useful for policy purposes as well. If
we …nd that the welfare derived from income depends on family size, this gives
a natural clue to the question what family allowance would keep the family at
the same household level if family size is increased from two to three by having a
child: the welfare a household derives from income is
Uind = ¤(yi;c;constant + 0:1lnfsi + 0:6lnyi;c;¾)
In order to keep welfare constant if fs increases from 2 to 3, we should add
0:1ln(3
2) to lnyi;c or multiply yi;c by (3
2)0:1
However, in the long run, this increase will not be enough to compensate the
family for an increase in family size, as current income yi;c increases and hence
¹. Therefore, we need a second increase of 0:1ln(3
2) ¤ 0:6 and so forth. The total




)[1 + 0:6 + 0:6




and this is precisely what the social standard welfare function would prescribe.
Here we encounter a dynamic aspect, viz., that the individual welfare function is
anchored on own current income. That is the meaning of preference drift. People
adapt their norms to the present situation.
Parts of this analysis are also possible on the separate ci levels without any
reference to a cardinal utility function (see Van Praag, Van der Sar (1988)).
5. Dynamics
In the previous section, we described how the need parameter ¹ could be explained
by variables such as family size and current income yc: The latter e¤ect is now
re…ned by supposing that ¹ depends not only on present income but also on
income in the past and income that is anticipated in the future. It follows that
in the ¹¡equation we replace yc by ...,y¡2;y¡1;y0;ˆ y1; ˆ y2;::: whereby y0 denotes
current income, y¡2;y¡1, for incomes one or two years in the past and where
ˆ y1 stands for anticipated future income in one year’s time. All experienced and
anticipated incomes contribute to the formation of our present norm on incomes.
In its simplest form, the ¹¡equation looks like




23where i refers to respondent i.
The coe¢cients ..,w¡2;w¡1;w0;w1;w2;:: are weights which add up to one,
whereby the weight w0 denotes the weight of the present income, while wp =
P¡1
t=¡1 wt and wf =
P1
t=1wt denote the weight of all past incomes and anticipated
future incomes respectively. Van Praag and Van Weeren (1983,1988) estimated
the parameters of this model on Dutch panel data. The main question concerns
how the distribution of time weights will look. They regressed ¹i on the incomes
of the three years in which the panel was held. For the second wave they found




where all coe¢cients are signi…cant. The results tell us that current income has
the greatest time-weight, which implies that the time-weight distribution peaks
near the present. Also, incomes in the past carry more time weight than incomes in
the future, which suggests that on aggregate the time-weight distribution peaks
just before the present. Of course, this is an aggregate relationship which will
di¤er for individuals of di¤erent ages and education pro…les. For a more com-
plete analysis, more incomes than the three available were needed. Therefore,
Van Praag and Van Weeren (1988) used econometric techniques to estimate the
incomes which were further back than one year, i.e. ...,y¡3,y¡2: They also esti-
mated incomes further than one year in the future, i.e. y2,y3;::: With the use of
this complete income stream, they looked somewhat further at the shape of the
time-weight distribution.8 In general, they found the time-weight distribution to
have the shape of a normal curve. More speci…cally, the time-weight distribution
may be characterized by a mode parameter, ¹¿; and a dispersion parameter, ¾¿:
The empirically estimated shapes of the time weight distribution are presented in
Figure 5.1 for three age brackets, viz., at 30, 50 and 70.
The most interesting points are that:
² The time weight distribution varies for di¤erent ages.
² The distribution is not symmetric around the present.
8The likely result of using estimates for some incomes is that the e¤ect of income di¤erent
from the present income will be underestimated. The qualitative results should, however, remain
the same.
24Figure 5.1:
² The time weights of the past are greatest for young and old people.
² The middle age bracket derives its norm mostly from the present and the
anticipated future.
² The dispersion of the distribution varies considerably over di¤erent ages. In
midlife, the time weights are extremely concentrated.
The mode and symmetry point of the time weight distribution is at ¹¿: We
call it the time focus of the individual. It shifts from more than one year in the
past, (-1.3) at 20, to almost half a year in the future, (0.45) at 50, while it shifts
back to the past, (-0.43) for the age of 70.
The change of ¾¿ is also interesting. We call ¾¿ the time span of the individual.
It is rather long for young individuals and shortens when people approach midlife.
The time span is intimately related to the velocity of time as it is perceived by
the individual. The midlife has a narrow time horizon which implies that the
individuals then live ”by the day”. The velocity of life is high. For young and old
people, the time horizon is wider and hence the velocity of time is lower. We call
the reciprocal of ¾¿; i.e. 1
¾¿ the subjective velocity of time.
In Table 3, we present the relevant …gures for several age classes. It is seen
that the subjective velocity of time 1
¾¿ increases by a factor 1:44
0:09 ¼ 15 up to midlife,
25and then falls by a factor 6 at age 70, and still more at later ages.
Table 3: Values of ¹¿;¾¿;wP;w0;wF
age ¹¿ ¾¿ wP w0 wF
20 -1.32 1.44 0.72 0.18 0.10
30 -0.32 0.71 0.40 0.48 0.12
40 0.27 0.26 0.00 0.81 0.19
50 0.45 0.09 0.00 0.70 0.30
60 0.22 0.21 0.00 0.91 0.09
70 -0.43 0.62 0.46 0.48 0.07
The time weight distribution is clearly important for individuals because it
determines the speed of adaptation of the income norms of the individual when
faced with changing circumstances. This may be the case for individuals who
become jobless and then become dependent on social bene…ts. The adaptation
process may be a reason to smooth the path of the income reduction over time,
in order to smooth the decline in welfare.
Another potential application is to evaluate the impact of in‡ation and ac-
celerating in‡ation on the income norms and the satisfaction level derived from
income. These applications are discussed in greater detail in Van Praag and van
Weeren (1988).
The research on the time weight distribution has not been repeated since
1988. Therefore, this must be seen as a …rst attempt, where the results have to
be considered with care. It may be that other models would yield other results.
This method of obtaining time weights is based on a simple household survey and
is very cheap compared to experimental laboratory experiments.
The estimates of time weights are exclusively based on the analysis of income
norms. The memory and anticipation weights from norms on other subjects, for
instance on fashion, housing, ethics, may be determined by other variables and
have di¤erent time weight distributions. There is a great need for more research
in this area and cooperation with psychologists.
6. Methodological discussion
The approach outlined above for measuring individual norms on income has been
expanded to other aspects such as age and education by Van Praag, Dubno¤ and
26Van der Sar (1988). More speci…cally, individuals were asked to connect age levels
to subjective labels in the following Age Evaluation Question:
”When I think of other adults, I consider people to be
young, if they are younger than............. years old
somewhat young, if they are about........ years old
middle aged, if they are about............... years old
somewhat old, if they are about............ years old
old, if they are older than..................... years old”
Similar to the analysis of the IEQ, it is possible to analyse the age norms
of respondents, for example, by explaining the answers by means of regression
analysis. In Van Praag et al. (1988) this is done level by level for the Boston
data set. Let ai (i=1..5) be the respondent’s age levels, then they consider the
equation
lnai = ®0;i + ®1;i lnage + ®2;i lnschooling + ®3;ilnfs + ®4;iDgender
where they assume that what is considered ”young” or ”old” depends on the age
of the respondent, the number of years of schooling, the size of the family and the
gender of the respondent. The results of the regressions are presented in Table 4.
From a statistical point of view, most coe¢cients are signi…cant and follow
a de…nite pattern. Our evaluation is that there is a strong systematic pattern
which indicates that there is no confusion in connotation. The fraction of the
variance explained, as measured by R2; is poor in comparison to that of the IEQ,
but is certainly not below standard for samples of micro-data of this size (¼ 500):
However, it implies that there are more individual factors which were not covered
in the survey, which must be added to the systematic structure than in the case
of income standards.
With respect to the interpretation of the coe¢cients, we make the following
observations. The older the respondent is, the higher his age standards. It follows
that if A is 10% older than B, he will have an age standard for ”younger” that
27Table 4: Regression equations for the age standards (N=538)
constant age education family size gender R2
young 1.414 0.319 0.180 0.069 0.027 0.091
(0.270) (0.043) (0.067) (0.026) (0.030)
somewhat young 2.329 0.266 0.045 0.056 0.019 0.135
(0.183) (0.029) (0.045) (0.018) (0.020)
middle-aged 3.160 0.177 0.014 0.016 0.048 0.163
(0.115) (0.018) (0.028) (0.011) (0.013)
somewhat old 3.740 0.117 0.018 0.003 0.047 0.132
(0.095) (0.015) (0.023) (0.009) (0.011)
old 4.243 0.058 0.067 0.003 0.048 0.071
(0.099) (0.016) (0.025) (0.010) (0.011)
standard deviations in parentheses
Source: Van Praag et al. (1988)
is about 3% higher (0.319*10%). Or in other words, if someone aged 20 …nds
himself ”somewhat young”, an older person will …nd him still ”young”. For the
age standards of ”old”, there is much less divergence between respondents of
di¤erent ages.
We see that schooling has a strong impact on the de…nition of ”young”; people
tend to stay ”young” longer. The impact of a large family on age standards is
also evident. In such families, youngsters are considered to be children longer.
The social implications of these tendencies are not imminent. However, cultur-
ally it might be of interest that, in western countries, where the level of education
has been increasing for decades, the concept of adulthood has become identi…ed
with an increase in age. Finally, the gender of the respondent also plays a role. If
the respondent is female, the age standards are somewhat higher than for males,
which implies that females tend to diminish the impact of age slightly. Except for
the female tendency to stay and look young as long as possible, it is in conformity
with the longevity of women compared to men.
Again we see that ”young” does not mean the same thing to young people
as to old people. We can derive a general age a¤








[®0;i + ®2;ilnschooling + ®3;i lnfs + ®4;iDgender]
The resulting age standards are tabulated in Table 5.
Similarly to the age evaluation question, individuals were asked which educa-
tion level they thought was ”very educated”, ”uneducated”, etc. By explaining
the answers to this Education Evaluation Question (EEQ), Van der Sar (1991)





somewhat young 30.16 30.95
middle-aged 49.54 52.50
somewhat old 65.73 69.31
old 75.06 78.91
Source: Van Praag et al. (1988)
was able to measure an individual norm on education as well. The interested
reader is referred to Van der Sar (1991) for a full discussion of the AEQ, EEQ,
and related questions.
6.1. Individual norms and general standards
The evidence described above suggests that people have subjective norms con-
cerning various concepts. These norms will di¤er among individuals. They are
measured by questions such as the IEQ, AEQ and EEQ, which supply us with
numerical levels related to verbal labels or other symbols.
These questions may be posed theoretically in two ways: one may supply the
label as stimulus and ask for an amount as a reply. Alternatively, one may supply
an amount as stimulus and ask a label as a reply. The …rst way has been selected
as the most practical when there are many di¤erent respondents with di¤ering
norms. It is also somewhat more informative, as people can space their answers.
In addition, we have evaluations by individuals of their own situation. This is
done by …tting their own situation on their own norm. For instance an individual
i with current income yc evaluates his own income by Ui(yc;yc;fs):
A …nal point is whether we may in some sense speak of general or social
objective standards in contrast to individual subjective norms. Each individual
may have an idea about what he thinks is a ”bad” or a ”good” income, but
is there also a way to give content to a social norm with respect to what is a
”good” income and what is a ”bad” income? This question is especially pertinent
when we think of a socially acceptable de…nition of poverty, or eligibility for social
assistance. A second example is the general standard for being ”old”, which is
relevant for …xing the retirement age. A general standard may be derived from the
individual standards by calculating the income level, age, education, etc., where
29people evaluate their own income, age, etc., as ”bad”, ”good” etc. or ”young”
and ”old”.
Political applications of the IEQ are not extensively dealt with in this chapter,
but we mention applications to poverty measurement (Goedhart et al. (1977), Van
Praag et al. (1982), Hagenaars (1986), Plug, Krause, Wagner, Van Praag (1997),
Van Praag and Flik (1992), Frijters and Van Praag (1996), Colasanto, Kapteyn
and Van der Gaag (1983), Stanovnik (1992)). Further applications concern income
inequality (Van Praag (1977)), household equivalence scales (Kapteyn and Van
Praag (1976), Van Praag and Warnaar (1997)), and climate equivalence scales
(Van Praag (1988), Frijters and Van Praag (1997)).
In this method, there is a strong anchor e¤ect. The answer of the respondent
depends very strongly on his own situation. One may attempt to avoid this, for
example, by asking
”Thinking about an average family with two children, what does it
need per month for an adequate living?” (cf. Rainwater (1971))
While avoiding the anchor e¤ect of one’s own situation, it introduces a new
problem: what should be regarded as an average family, which will depend on
the reference weighting system of the respondent. We can at least deal with the
anchor e¤ect of the individual’s situation, as we know the own situation of the
respondent, but we do not know what the respondent considers to be an average
family. The usefulness of this question thus depends on whether it is reasonable
to assume that there is common agreement about what constitutes an average
family. In heterogeneous populations, such agreement will be absent.
Obviously, the method works only to evaluate one-dimensional situations where
numbers may be assigned and where a natural ordering is manifest.
A problem where the described IEQ method breaks down is when the society
is only partly monetized. In that case, welfare cannot be characterised on the one-
dimensional income scale. An ingenious way out has been suggested by Pradhan
and Ravallion (1997). Their approach is to ask for evaluations of consumption
levels instead of evaluations of income levels.
At present, welfare functions have been measured in nearly all EC countries,
the USA, Hungary, Slovenia, Poland and Russia. In almost all cases, except in
the USA, the samples were fairly large scale, ranging from 1000 respondents to
over 20,000. Panel data are scarce; the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel carried the
question for a number of years, while at present, a Russian large-scale household
panel includes the question as well (see Frijters and Van Praag (1996)).
307. Future directions: well-being and welfare
Traditionally, economists identify welfare (or even happiness) with income. How-
ever, it is well known and also fully recognised by other disciplines that there is
more between heaven and earth than income and everything that can be bought
with income.
This calls for an operational distinction between economic welfare and well-
being. Welfare is the evaluation assigned by the individual to income or, more
generally, to the contribution to our well-being from those goods and services
that we can buy with money.
Next to material resources, we have other aspects which determine the quality
of our life. We can think of our health, the relationship with our partner and family
and friends, the quality of our work (job satisfaction), our political freedom, our
physical environment, etc. We shall call this comprehensive concept well-being or
quality of life (see Nussbaum and Sen (eds., 1992) for philosophical discussions
about this concept).
It is empirically possible for most individuals to evaluate their life as a whole.
A well-known example is the following question devised by Cantril (1965):
”Here is a ladder with ten steps which denotes the ”ladder of life”.
The bottom step stands for the worst possible life. If you climb up
and arrive at the tenth step, you arrive at the best possible life. Can
you indicate where you are at the moment?”
Other questions which are very similar to Cantril’s question ask individuals
to denote how satis…ed or how happy they are with their life as a whole. The
concept of well-being is thus very similar to that of life-satisfaction or happiness,
and we will not discuss the di¤erences.
These questions are a standard module in many psycho-sociological surveys
and respondents have no di¢culty responding. See Veenhoven (1996) and Diener
and Suh (1997) for reviews of the psychological literature on well-being. It is also
obvious that responding to these questions is tantamount to evaluating one’s life
situation on a bounded numerical scale between zero and ten.
In fact, we have here a measurement method which de…nes the well-being con-
cept in an operational way. We notice that what we measure is an evaluation of
the individual’s actual situation. Hence it is not an ”individual norm”, as mea-
sured by the IEQ, where six qualitative labels are linked to income levels, yielding
31an ”income norm”. The Cantril question provides us with a social standard on
well-being.
We assume again, as is always done implicitly, that the respondent’s answers
are comparable, in the sense that individuals evaluating their life with the same
grade, such as a 5 or an 8, are equally unhappy or happy with their life. The main
questions are:
a. What determines well-being?
b. What are the di¤erences between welfare and well-being?
Plug and Van Praag (1995), Plug (1997), analysed these two questions on
a large sample (1991) of about 6000 Dutch married couples, with the husband
younger than 65 years of age. They hypothesised that well-being, to be denoted
by W, depends on various contributing factors and determinants. Some of these
factors are objective ones, like family size, income, age, and religion. Other vari-
ables are called ”problem intensities”. They relate to the intensity with which an
individual ”has problems” with his health, job, marriage, physical environment,
etc.9 Formally we write
W = W(P;z)
where P stands for a vector of problem areas and z for a number of objective
variables. Problem intensities, such as Phealth; Pjob; ..., are operationalized by
questions asking individuals ”many/few/no problem” questions. An example of
such a question is:
”Have you had problems in the last three months with your health?
No / a little / some / serious?”
The outcomes are on a numerical scale10. Plug and Van Praag (1995) found
9In the article, Plug and Van Praag name the extent to which individuals are free of a
problem, a ”partial satisfaction”. However, given that this term may be confusing, we use here
the term problem intensities.
10For estimation purposes, they prefer to transform W and P from their bounded scale into (-
1;+1). It might be feared that people will center in the middle and that extreme answers will
be rare. To solve both problems, the empirical distribution functions ˜ F of the W and P values
are calculated, and the value ˜ F is assigned to the various levels instead of the original ones.
Then they transform ˜ F again by taking the inverse standard normal, which means that instead
of W and P ˜ W=N¡1( ~ Fw(W);0;1) and ˜ P=N¡1( ~ Fp(P);0;1) are utilized. The transformations do
no intrinsic harm, but they are only used to get more response di¤erentiation and a stretching
on (-1;+1). From now on we will drop the tildes.
32the estimates presented in Table 6.
The …rst column refers to the explanation of well-being, while the second col-
umn refers to the explanation of ¹ by the same variables. The …rst nine variables
stand for ”problems with health”, ”problems with partner”, ”with the job”, ”with
sleep”, ”with alcohol and drugs”, ”with the family”, ”sexual problems”, ”prob-
lems with parents” and the evaluation of the neighborhood. These variables reach
their highest value when there are no problems. ”Religion” stands for the intensity
of religious feelings where the highest value corresponds to ”non-religious”. The
IEQ measures welfare, while the Cantril question measures the broader concept
of life satisfaction or well-being.
The main di¤erence between welfare and well-being is that ”problem” vari-
ables hardly a¤ect the evaluation of income but do, however, a¤ect well-being.
The second question is also answered at the same time. Welfare and well-being
are di¤erent concepts, where welfare is only dependent on a small subset of the
set of variables which in‡uence well-being. The size and sign of the e¤ect is also
di¤erent.
To illustrate the relevance of the results, Plug and Van Praag estimated the
optimum number of children, as family size appears quadratically in W. This
optimum number of children depends on such factors as income. Table 7 was
derived for the Netherlands. It shows that the optimum number of children is
zero for a family with an annual after-tax income of NLG 20,418. For a family
with an annual income of NLG 51,451 two children are the optimum family size.
An especially promising path is the combination of more than one satisfaction
measure. We will explain this idea with a speci…c example from Van Praag and
Plug (1995).
We consider again the social standard function of income as derived in section
4, which we denote by ˜ U(y;fs) and where we ignore other variables. We know
already that ˜ U decreases with the number of children. More speci…cally, it is
possible to assess the monetary value of the ”welfare cost of additional children”.
Assuming that a representative couple has two children and an annual income
of $50,000, their welfare will be ˜ U(50;4). Assume now that the couple has an-
other child, which causes ˜ U to change to ˜ U(50;5). The welfare decline may be
compensated by an income increase 4Uy such that
~ U(50 + 4
Uy;5) = ~ U(50;4)
We call ¢Uy the shadow price of the additional child, which is the monetary
33amount needed to keep a household on the same welfare level11. Notice that this
depends on the rank order of the child and that the shadow price will depend on
income.
On the other hand, we have the well-being measure W, based on the Cantril
question yielding a well-being function
W(y;fs)
again ignoring all other variables. Given our estimates of the previous table, W
is strongly quadratic in fs, implying that well-being initially increases with family
size up to a certain point, whereafter it falls with an increasing family size. This
non-monotonic behavior points to the fact that an extra child may be wanted for
its non-economic contribution. It is a gain for well-being while at the same time a
loss in terms of welfare. Hence there are non-monetary bene…ts of having children
and monetary costs. The W function captures both and increases in family size if
the bene…ts outweigh the costs, and decreases if the costs outweigh the bene…ts.
There is equality at the optimum family size.
Considering W(y,fs) we may calculate the shadow well-being price of an addi-
tional child ¢Wy, by solving
W(y;fs) = W(y + ¢
Wy;fs + ¢fs)
Here ¢Wy is the monetary counter value of this di¤erence:
¢
Wy = Benefits ¡ Costs
We call it the shadow price with repect to well-being. It is positive if we
welcome a child and negative if the opposite holds. From the calculation on U,
we obtained an estimate of the cost
¢
Uy = Costs
Addition yields ¢Wy + ¢Uy = monetary value of bene…ts.
The bene…ts may be considerable, as is wittnessed by the fact that childless
couples try to adopt children or are willing to undergo expensive medical treat-
ment. From Van Praag and Plug, we show the following Table 8, where the
bene…ts of children are calculated for Dutch families in 1991.
11The ”cost of children” will at least include the expenditures on an additional child. Future
research looks at whether it also includes the monetary shadow-value of time spent on a child.
34We see that the value of the (non-monetary) bene…ts of the …rst child is neg-
ative at a low income level. The bene…t of the …rst child becomes positive for
incomes above NLG 20,000. For the second child, the bene…ts remain negative
until an income of about NLG 40,000. For the third and fourth child, the bene…ts
remain negative for even longer. With respect to costs, there is no ambiguity;
costs are always positive. However, the cost of each additional child decreases.
As we can see, these non-monetary bene…ts are substantial and increase strongly
with income.
At this stage, we warn that the study is in the beginning stage and that not
too much value should be assigned to this or other results without replication.
However, the path seems promising. A future step is to estimate the substitution
and trade-o¤ between variables and the calculation of monetary values of health
increases, family increases, education, marriage quality, etc.
See Frijters (1998) for other applications and extensions of Leyden methodol-
ogy on welfare and satisfaction.
8. Conclusions
The work originating from the Leyden School has tried to operationalize the con-
cepts of welfare, well-being, etc., which are considered immeasurable and esoteric
by most of the economic profession. With rather simple and inexpensive questions
in large-scale surveys, considerable information has been found on feelings. At
least the feelings of welfare and well-being may be ”explained” by objectively mea-
surable variables and by partial satisfaction measures with respect to aspects of
life. The information is helpful for quantifying memory and anticipation weights.12
The potential policy applications are plentiful. We brie‡y described its use to cal-
culate family equivalence scales. A rather recent development is the combination
of the welfare and well-being measurement, which makes it possible to identify
the cost and bene…ts of various choices. We demonstrated this for the option of
choosing to have children.
The apparatus developed thus far is not typically restricted to economic prob-
lems, but can also be used by psychologists, sociologists, and political scientists.
Its use in health economics seems straightforward.
12In Van Praag (1981), Kapteyn (1977), Van der Sar (1991), Van de Stadt et al. (1985),
Kapteyn et al. (1976), the IEQ was also used for the extraction of information on the social
reference mechanism, as the answers to the IEQ are in‡uenced by social reference groups. This
application was not dealt with in this chapter.
35The story is hopefully not …nished but only in the early stages. The main
empirical restriction is that the data sets are scattered and almost never contain
the IEQ, sound economic information (consumption, income, job characteristics)
and at the same time ”soft” information on feelings on several aspects of life, such
as the Cantril question. In this respect, the USA, where so much e¤ort is given
to research, is conspicuously absent.
Keywords: measurement of welfare, well-being, social …lter, interpersonal com-
parison, social reference group, individual welfare functions, utility.
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Source: Van Praag and Plug(1995)
Table 7: The optimum family size for speci…c income levels
fs=1 fs=2 fs=3 fs=4 fs=5 fs=6
8,103 20,418 35,060 51,451 69,280 88,346
note: family income is measured in Dutch guilders (2 guilders is about 1 dollar)
43Table 8
Money value of non–monetary child benefits
One breadwinner
Income 1th child 2th child 3th child 4th child
20,000 –262 –838 –1005 –1039
30,000 1114 –236 –748 –959
40,000 2911 651 –279 –713
50,000 5023 1749 348 –341
60,000 7383 3018 1100 130
Two breadwinners
Income 1th child 2th child 3th child 4th child
20,000 –726 –1153 –1240 –1223
30,000 419 –708 –1100 –1236
40,000 1983 22 –747 –1082
50,000 3871 964 –237 –802
60,000 5990 2074 399 –423
44